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Film Narrator and the Early American Screenwriting Manuals  
Some of the most influential accounts of the transition from the cinema of 
attractions to narrative cinema have relied heavily on the figure of the film 
narrator. Tom Gunning (1994), for instance, has explained D.W. Griffith’s 
innovations in terms of Genettian extradiegetic narrator. André Gaudreault 
(2009) has argued that the filmic narrative agency existed even before these 
developments in editing in the figure of the monstrator. This paper argues that in 
general early narrative cinema introduced no such narrators. The argument is 
twofold. First, I demonstrate that film narrators Gunning and Gaudreault speak of 
are not merely theoretical abstractions but entities which populate fictional 
worlds much like fictional characters do. Yet the ontological aspects of their 
theories hinge on a formally invalid argument that can be tracked to Christian 
Metz and Albert Laffay. Although this means that fictional narratives do not 
necessarily introduce fictional narrators, it does not mean that they cannot. If 
narrative cinema introduced fictional narrators, then the best-case scenario in 
support of Gunning and Gaudreault’s view is that these were so novel that they 
were identified by their contemporaries. In the second part of the paper, 
therefore, I turn to historical data. I show that even the arguably most informed 
contemporary writings on the subject – screenwriting manuals – fail to identify 
any such entities. In fact, in making their own vocal ontological claims about the 
absence of film narrators the manuals present an alternative theory to Gunning 
and Gaudreault’s which articulates how a fictional narrative can proceed without 
a fictional narrator.  
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Is there a film narrator? 
If the existence of a narrative in film is a necessary criterion for the existence of a film 
narrator can we say that the latter appears immediately with the appearance of the 
 
 
former? In other words, do all film narratives have a film narrator by definition? With 
some notable exceptions, this is indeed the prevalent view among film scholars, so 
prevalent that the debates about the existence of film narrators take place only on the 
fringes of the discipline.i As such, this paper hopes to reanimate the interest in the 
question whose answer has been taken for granted for quite some time, by arguing not 
only that the accepted answer is mistaken but that by reopening the question we gain 
theoretical and historical insights alike. This is best fleshed out by engaging perhaps the 
key two book-length accounts of narration in early cinema – Tom Gunning’s D. W. 
Griffith and the Origins of American Narrative Film and André Gaudreault’s From 
Plato to Lumière –which claim that fictional narrators emerge in the early period and 
remain the mainstay of cinema to this very day.ii This is how Gunning and Gaudreault 
articulate their position:  
Because film’s narrative discourse represents the actual text of a film – its 
existence as a series of filmic images – no narrative film can exist except through 
its narrative discourse. It logically follows that every narrative film has a filmic 
narrator embodied by this discourse. (Gunning 1994, 21) 
A narrative work (a film, a novel, or another work) would thus be the result of a 
tension between two poles: on the one hand, the diegetic universe (the story told), 
and on the other, the agent that organizes this world (the storyteller). […] Every 
narrative is simultaneously a discourse (the discourse of the storyteller) and a story 
(the story told). (Gaudreault 2009, 58)  
I argue that this generally accepted view is mistaken for two reasons. First, because 
there exist narratives without narrators and because it is possible to narrate fictionally 
without fictionally narrating. Second, because contemporary accounts of early cinema 
in the trade press which are best placed to spot potentially novel ontological entities 
such as film narrators strongly suggest that one of the main differences between literary 
and film fiction is precisely the absence of narrators in the latter. The goal of the article, 
 
 
therefore, is to move away from linguistic models which have informed our 
understanding of narration for far too long and to appreciate the discourse in 
screenwriting manuals as serious contributions to the discussions about the ontology of 
film narrators.  
When it comes to fictional narratives to which both devote most of their 
attention, it is crucial to understand that Gunning and Gaudreault alike emphasize that 
the narrator is not the flesh and blood author but an entity internal to the text. In other 
words, in fiction film the narrator is fictional and as such distinct from the actual author. 
In this Gunning and Gaudreault are fully in line with Gerard Genette’s key articulation 
of the distinction between the narrator and the author: 
It is not Abbé Prévost who tells of the love of Manon and Des Grieux, it is not even 
the Marquis de Renoncourt, supposed author of the Mémoires d’un homme de 
qualité; it is Des Grieux himself, in an oral narrative where ‘I’ can designate only 
him, and where ‘here’ and ‘now’ refer to the spatiotemporal circumstances of that 
narrating and in no way to the circumstances of the writing of Manon Lescaut by 
its real author. And even the references in Tristram Shandy to the situation of 
writing speak to the (fictive) act of Tristram and not the (real) one of Sterne; in a 
more subtle and also more radical way, the narrator of Pere Goriot ‘is’ not Balzac, 
even if here and there he expresses Balzac’s opinions, for this author-narrator is 
some-one who ‘knows’ the Vauquer boardinghouse, its landlady and its lodgers, 
whereas all Balzac himself does is imagine them; and in this sense, of course, the 
narrative situation is never reduced to its situation of writing. (Genette 1980, 214, 
italics in the original) 
Most importantly, Gunning and Gaudreault’s invocation of the film narrator does not 
only purport to explain in pragmatic terms how film narratives are understood. Film 
narrator is not merely a theoretical abstraction for these scholars. Gunning and 
Gaudreault’s claims about the existence of film narrators are also ontological. For 
Gunning, for instance, this is clear from the fact that the Genettian narrator he 
 
 
subscribes to is a fictional entity which is a part of the work’s fictional world. In the 
above example, the anonymous narrator of Pere Goriot is fictional in the same sense 
that character-narrators Des Grieux and Tristram Shandy are fictional.iii And their acts 
of narrating are fictional in the sense that the acts of fictional characters, such as Eugène 
de Rastignac moving to Paris, are fictional. As Gunning puts it: ‘The story is an 
imaginary construction that the spectator or reader creates while reading the narrative 
discourse of the actual text. Likewise, access to the act of narrating (in written literature 
and in film, at least) is dependent on the traces of telling that exist in the text.’ (Gunning 
1994, 15). Given that fiction is that what the spectator or reader are mandated or 
supposed to imagine based on the text, both the narrator and the act of narrating are 
fictional for Gunning. Mandate, here, should be understood as a normative category 
meaning that it only describe what readers and spectators should do. Of course, they can 
refuse the mandate, imagine something completely different, or make a mistake like the 
anecdotal rube stopping the theatre performance to save Desdemona. But to properly 
play the game of make-believe that is fiction they should observe the mandates.iv 
For Gaudreault it is no different. He explicitly quotes Albert Laffay’s early 
narratological piece to describe the film narrator as a sort of a fictional character: 
‘[Laffay] define[d] with great theoretical precision and adroitness the figure that stands 
in the background of all film narrative works, although he did not yet dare call that 
figure the “film narrator.” For Laffay, this figure is a “fictive and invisible character 
[…]”’ (Gaudreault 2009, 5).  
The logic behind both Gunning’s and Gaudreault’s arguments, then, is 
essentially that of Laffay as popularized by Christian Metz (1974, 20–21): because 
narrative discourse, i.e. the presentation of a story is nothing but the narrative text itself, 
there necessarily needs to be an agent doing this presenting, i.e. the narrator. In other 
 
 
words, because every narrative work is a product of narrating there needs to be a 
narrator. There is certainly nothing problematic in claiming with Gaudreault and 
Gunning that if there is narrating then there needs to be a narrator. In fact, this is a 
tautology. The problem arises because at the same time they mean that if there is 
narrating of a fictional story then there needs to be a fictional narrator. But this is as 
formally valid as saying that if there is narrating of a short story then there needs to be a 
short narrator. It is true that, as Gunning points out, if there is a message, construed as 
an intentional artefact, then there is also a sender. But if the message has a content 
which mandates specific imaginings it does not follow that these mandates also include 
imagining a sender, i.e. a fictional narrator. The same is especially true of visual 
messages.  
This, however, does not necessarily preclude the possibility that the specific 
narrative films that Gaudreault and Gunning focus on mandate imagining narrators. 
Gaudreault, for instance, distinguishes between two agents of narrative discourse in film 
– the monstrator and the narrator proper. Whereas the latter appears only with editing 
and oversees connecting the shots into a sequence the former is ushered into existence 
with the earliest film narratives and controls the showing of the content of single-shot 
films. In other words, for Gaudreault a specific form of the narrator – the monstrator – 
should already be present in films like The Arrival of a Train/L'arrivée d'un train en 
gare de La Ciotat (Auguste and Louis Lumière, 1895, 1896, 1897) or The Haverstraw 
Tunnel (American Mutoscope and Biograph Company, 1897).  
Gaudreault cites contemporary sources – judicial decisions – as proof of his 
claims. Specifically, two copyright lawsuits and their accompanying decisions from 
1902 and 1905, according to Gaudreault, present the first identifications and 
articulations of the concepts of monstrator and narrator proper, respectively. The first 
 
 
lawsuit concerns an actuality film so the conclusions he draws from it cannot be applied 
to the discussion of fictional narrators. But his discussion of the 1904 Personal 
originally shot by American Mutoscope and Biograph Company and quickly duped by 
the Edison Manufacturing Company under the title How a French Nobleman Got a Wife 
through the ‘New York Herald’ Personal Columns clearly can. 
The 1902 lawsuit determined that it is sufficient to copyright only one 
photograph from a single-shot film to copyright the whole film and thus articulated film 
not as a mere amalgam of photographs but as a unity of these photographs. For 
Gaudreault this means that it has been recognized that the photographs are linked 
together through a discourse whose agent is none other than the narrator proper. Once 
Porter duped the American Mutoscope and Biograph Company’s Personal in 1904, 
Biograph quickly sued the Edison Manufacturing Company arguing that given that 
Biograph had copyrighted one photograph from their film the whole film is copyrighted 
which means that Edison had infringed on this copyright. Porter and Edison’s lawyers 
retorted that in order to copyright the whole film American Mutoscope and Biograph 
Company had to have copyrighted 8 photographs – one from each of the film’s 8 shots 
– because the film is merely an agglomerate of 8 distinct and separate films. According 
to Gaudreault, whereas Biograph effectively argued that the film was narrated by 
combining shots into a unity, Edison claimed that no such narrating is taking place and 
that the film is simply a sequence of disparate shots. In the end, Judge Lanning sided 
with the former view stating: 
I am unable to see why, if a series of pictures of a moving object taken by a pivoted 
camera may be copyrighted as a photograph, a series of pictures telling a single 
story like that of the complainant in this case, even though the camera be placed at 
different points, may also not be copyrighted as a photograph [...] In that story, it is 
true, there are different scenes. But no one has ever suggested that a story told in 
 
 
written words may not be copyrighted merely because, in unfolding its incidents, 
the reader is carried from one scene to another. (Quoted in Gaudreault 2009, 112). 
To Gaudreault’s mind ‘[t]his recognition of the film narrator [...] [establishes] the film 
equivalent of the textual narrator’ (ibid., italics in the original). But as we can see from 
Gaudreault’s ontological commitments and Genette’s quote above the textual narrator is 
a fictional entity engaged in a fictional activity. When reading Tristram Shandy the 
readers are mandated to imagine that Tristram is writing the book which consists of 
exactly the same words as Sterne’s book. Are we as viewers mandated to imagine 
anything similar in Personal or its dupe? A fictional agency in control of combining the 
shots and presenting them as a story? Nothing of the sort exists. I am not denying that 
there is a certain equivalence between different camera placements and carrying the 
reader from one scene to another, as Gaudreault puts it, but this equivalence is only on 
the level of narrating and not on the level of fictional narrating. Gaudreault’s 
narratology, in other words, can only provide theoretical models for distinguishing the 
forms of narrative discourse but, unlike Genette’s, it can tell us little about the fictional 
status of narrators.  
What is important to note is that Gaudreault’s recourse to historical data to 
support his theoretical point is not the problem here. It is reasonable to engage 
contemporary writing on the subject, because it is likeliest that as the cinema was 
becoming more narrative it is precisely at that moment that the textual features 
mandating the fictional narrator – if such a figure did appear – would have been spotted 
by contemporaries. The issue is that the contemporary judicial decision Genette cites 
merely demonstrates that the fictional story is narrated. Judge Lanning never suggests 
that the fictional story is fictionally narrated.  
 
 
 The situation is similar with Gunning’s study. Gunning distinguishes three 
aspects of narrative discourse – the pro-filmic, enframing, and editing. Whereas the pro-
filmic concerns mise-en-scène in the theatrical sense of the word and enframing pertains 
to the manipulations of camera and film stock, editing is a matter of joining enframed 
shots together. In Gaudreault’s vocabulary the first two aspects of narrative discourse 
are the monstrator’s responsibility and the last one that of the narrator proper. Gunning, 
by contrast, prefers to speak of a single filmic narrator embodied by narrative discourse 
overall because the last aspect need not be necessarily present.v Gunning’s point is that 
the filmic narrator becomes truly visible only with the developments taking place 
between 1908 and 1913 in what he dubs ‘the narrator system’ when moral commentary, 
characterization, and the formation of unambiguous temporal relations become more 
pronounced.  
Gunning’s analysis of Griffith’s early films at Biograph is a detailed study of 
how each of the aspects of narrative discourse contributed to conveying moral 
commentary, characterization, and temporal relations in narrative fiction film. The 
book’s problems arise, however, when the role of imagination is taken into 
consideration because these very films are at the same time understood to be narrated 
not only by Griffith the author but fictionally as well. For want of space I cannot 
consider all of Gunning’s examples, so I will only tackle The Song of the Shirt (D.W. 
Griffith, 1908) in more detail which, as Gunning himself puts it, ‘exemplifies Griffith’s 
work in Genette’s category of voice, expressing the filmic narrator’s judgments about 
characters or actions through contrast edits’ (1994, 132). ‘For Genette,’ Gunning 
continues, ‘voice refers to the act of narrating the story and to the elements of the text 
which refer to this act’ (ibid.). And, to be perfectly clear, under Genette’s model this act 
of narrating as well as its agent are necessarily fictional: 
 
 
[the] confusion [between the author and the narrator] is perhaps legitimate in the 
case of a historical narrative or a real autobiography, but not when we are dealing 
with a narrative of fiction, where the role of narrator is itself fictive. […] it is this 
narrating instance that we have still to look at [under the category of voice], 
according to the traces it has left—the traces it is considered to have left—in the 
narrative discourse it is considered to have produced. (Genette 1980, 213–214) 
The Song of the Shirt is a story of a seamstress who tries to find work in order to 
provide for her sick sister but once she does and completes the task she is refused 
payment. Her subsequent pleas with the factory owner and the foreman fall on barren 
ground and upon her return home her sister dies in front of her eyes.  
Gunning identifies the final three shots as the core of the film’s social 
commentary – whereas in the first shot the factory owner dances merrily with two girls 
and in the second the foreman wines and dines in the same upscale restaurant, in the last 
shot the seamstress’ sister finally succumbs to her affliction in a shabby room. And 
Gunning also articulates the key role editing has in this process distinguishing between 
contrast editing whose primary concern is the juxtaposition of the lives of the wealthy 
and the poor, and parallel editing which is mainly motivated by temporal relations and 
deadlines. In other words, it is undeniable that the story is a social critique and that this 
critique has been articulated through narrative discourse. But this does not mean that 
anybody from the story world is responsible for this narrative discourse. As this typical 
entry from the catalogue attests, the story is simply shown without any fictional 
showing taking place: ‘In this Biograph story are shown two orphaned sisters, in 
poverty and sickness, struggling to eke an existence, frugal though it be’ (quoted in 
Niver 1971, 403).  The viewers are not mandated to imagine anybody juxtaposing these 




As far as the fictional narrator is concerned, nothing changes even when editing 
in Griffith becomes, to use Gunning’s words, ‘supernatural’ or ‘transcendental’ as it 
does in After Many Years (1908). Shot eight in which the shipwrecked husband kisses 
the locket with the image of his wife inside is immediately followed by a shot of the 
wife with her hands outstretched as though she is trying to embrace her missing 
husband. Indisputably, we are no longer in the territory of using editing only for 
spatiotemporal relations, moral contrasts, or psychological characterization. But this 
does not warrant Gunning to claim that this cut ushers in a ‘transcendent witness’ 
involving ‘a ménage à trois among husband, wife, and uniting narrator’ (Gunning 1994, 
113, 114). Griffith is undeniably excelling in narrating as Sterne is, but unlike Sterne he 
is not involving any fictional narrators. Put otherwise, the cut is clearly a trace of 
narrating – but it is not a trace of fictional narrating. By identifying the company team 
rather than some fictional agency as the one responsible for the narrative, the catalogue 
entry also supports this view: ‘The Biograph Company here presents a subject on the 
lines of Enoch Arden, although more intensely heart-stirring than the original story’ 
(quoted in Niver 1971, 399).  
If there is an early film which at least approaches what it would mean for there 
to be a fictional filmic narrator, then it is The Big Swallow (John Williamson, 1901). 
The film depicts a man angered by finding himself to be an object of a camera. To this 
he reacts by walking up to the recording device so close that only his mouth can be 
seen. At this point he swallows both the camera and the operator upon which he moves 
back to a close-up of his face in which he expresses his great satisfaction with the snack. 
But even in this film the audience is mandated to imagine somebody showing the film 
only to the point where the man’s mouth covers the screen. In the remainder of the film 
there is no additional camera and no additional operator within the diegetic world 
 
 
standing at the very spot where the gobbled-up camera and operator stood and showing 
us the film’s second part.  
The catalogue entry for Williamson’s film is also clear that the fictional showing 
is going on only halfway:  
‘I won’t! I won’t! I’ll eat the camera first!’ Gentleman reading, finds a camera 
fiend with his head under cloth, focusing him up. He orders him off, approaching 
nearer and nearer, gesticulating and ordering the photographer off, until his head 
fills the picture, and finally his mouth only occupies the screen. He opens it, and 
first the camera, and then the operator disappear inside. He retires munching him 
up and expressing his great satisfaction. (“Charles Urban Trading Co. November 
1903 Catalogue”, 115) 
In contrast to the catalogue articulation of ‘showing’ discussed above, in The Big 
Swallow it is clear that the spectators are mandated to imagine ‘a camera fiend’ 
‘focusing [the gentlemen] up’. In other words, on those rare occasions when fictional 
showing in early cinema is mandated, it is likely to be recognized as such by 
contemporaries because, to repeat, mandates are a part of the text. Therefore, let us 
follow Gaudreault’s lead and turn to the contemporary discourse which, given that it 
was directed at aspiring storytellers and practicing filmmakers at a time when these 
textually visible mandates would have been forming, arguably has the highest chance of 
identifying the fictional narrator in early cinema – screenwriting manuals and the 
discussions of narrative clarity in the trade press during the transitional era. 
Contemporary Narratological Discourse 
It is well known that narrative clarity was one of the key concerns in the transitional era 
when it comes to film’s narrative function. Although in the US, as both Gunning and 
Gaudreault remind us, this demand for comprehensibility saw the renewed popularity of 
lecturers between 1908 and 1912, the ideal solution to meeting this demand was always 
 
 
with recourse to the visual track alone. The idea that the spectator should be able to 
reconstruct the story by simply looking at the screen appears at least as early as 1906 – 
in an Edison Manufacturing Company’s advertisement we read that their ‘latest 
dramatic success […] Kathleen Mavourneen […] tells its own story – plainer than 
words’ (New York Clipper, September 8, 1906, 766). By 1908 the issue of narrative 
comprehensibility arose to such prominence in the trade press that the following 
correspondence appeared:  
Many a time I have watched a new film subject projected on the screen and thought 
to myself: If I only knew what this or that part of the picture meant, then I could 
get very much more enjoyment out of the entertainment. But how would it be 
possible for the theater manager to explain the film subjects unless the film 
manufacturer furnishes a printed description of each picture when they are sent 
out? I think that half of the time the theater manager himself does not understand 
the picture as it is projected on the canvas. If some film manufacturer would make 
every one of his film subjects explain themselves as they pass through the machine 
he would soon have all the business he could attend to. If instead of having a few 
words of explanation on his film about every 100 feet, as most of them do, they 
would have these explanations come in at every 20 or 30 feet (or at every place on 
film wherein an explanation was necessary), then the theater manager would have 
no use for a lecturer. […] W. M. RHOADS. 
In reply: The idea of a lecturette is a good one, but one that few proprietors will 
take the trouble to arrange. For instance, Kalem Company arranged a lecturette or 
resume of the story of Evangeline to go with that film; we understand that so few 
exhibitors applied for it that the company abandoned the idea of reprinting. To 
issue titles every 100 feet would unnecessarily add to the cost of the film and is a 
little too much to ask renters to pay 12 cents per foot for title. We would blame the 
actors inasmuch as they did not render the story intelligently. A perfectly thought 
out plot, well put together, should tell its own story. (Moving Picture World, 
February 22, 1908, 143) 
We are dealing with a crisis of narrative comprehensibility here and although various 
solutions are proposed in both the letter and the response to it – providing a synopsis to 
 
 
the audiences in the form of printed material, increasing the number of leaders, and 
using lecturers – the ideal solution that crystalizes is that the film ‘should tell its own 
story’. This notion would remain the mainstay of thinking about the matter throughout 
the transitional era.vi As late as 1913, for instance, Adolph Zukor is reported as saying: 
‘We are trying to let the story tell itself so far as possible’ (Pictures April 1913, 19).vii   
To put it in Gunning’s terms, the film learning to tell its own story amounts to 
developments in narrative discourse such as those he describes in his book on Griffith. 
So, for Gunning learning to tell its own story essentially translates to introducing the 
narrator who tells the story. My argument, however, is that these developments 
introduce no such mandates to imagine. Next to analytic arguments marshalled above 
and negative evidence of the absence of narrators in contemporary catalogues the 
positive proof for my claim can be found in the screenwriting manuals and instructions 
for screenwriters which start appearing with regularity around 1910. These documents 
strongly suggest that there is no fictional narrator in film and in doing so articulate an 
alternative to Gunning and Gaudreault’s view.  
Because film narrators, as I have argued above, are not only theoretical 
constructs but populate fictional worlds as well, contemporary accounts can tell us 
whether film narrators exist or not. Both the contemporary theorists and early manual 
writers make ontological claims about film narrators. As such contemporaries enter into 
dialogue with later accounts of film narrators starting with Laffay and Metz even if 
these do not mention the former. This is so because if something is fictional then there 
is a mandate to imagine it. Given that mandates are present for all to see (spectators and 
theorists alike), there is no reason to think that film narratologists since the 1960s have 
been in a more privileged position to spot these mandates than contemporaries. If 
anything, the novelty of these mandates would have been more noticeable to those 
 
 
witnessing the advent of narrative cinema, especially those invested in advising how to 
write film stories. What the following pages demonstrate is that the textual features that 
Gunning and Gaudreault take to be the sign of fictional film narrators, the contemporary 
screenwriters identify merely as sign of film as an artefact made by flesh and blood 
agents invested in narrating. Most likely this is because whereas Gunning and 
Gaudreault are subscribed to the idea that every (fictional) narrative has a (fictional) 
narrator, contemporaries understood that there are narratives which have no narrators.  
By the late aughts conditions in the American film industry led to such a 
demand for original fiction story films – or photoplays as they were called then – that 
the demand could not be met by the production companies’ creative staff alone. To 
address this need, the producers turned to the open market and started soliciting scripts. 
This, in turn, opened a market for columns advising aspiring screenwriters, 
screenwriting textbooks, and even film magazines devoted exclusively to 
‘photoplaywrigths’. For instance, as early as August 20, 1910 Film Index devoted a full 
page to William K. Mitchell’s the ‘Tribulations of a Scenario Writer’. William Lord 
Wright wrote columns ‘For Those Who Worry O’er Plots and Plays’ and ‘For 
Photoplay Authors’ for Motion Picture World (from March 1912) and New York 
Dramatic Mirror (from March 1913), respectively. Similarly, specialized magazines 
such as The Photo Playwright and Photoplay Author appeared in April 1912 and 
January 1913, respectively. By 1915 Clarence J. Caine could publish a book-length 
collection of his writings on the topic originally appearing in Picture-Play Weekly and 
Picture-Play Magazine.viii The first textbooks such as E. J. Muddle’s Picture Plays and 
How To Write Them and Ralph P. Stoddard’s The Photo-play can be tracked to at least 
1911 and, much like other commentary, readily promulgate the ideal of narrative clarity 
adopted from the preceding trade press commentary: 
 
 
The story must be told by a series of happenings. While titles and sub-titles are 
used, and often strengthen the interest in the story, no manufacturer would buy a 
Scenario which would not stand alone or carry its story to the audience by the 
pictures, regardless of the title. (Stoddard 1991, 9). 
The idea that the story tells itself, or, as we read here that it is ‘told by a series of 
happenings’ strongly suggests the view that for contemporaries there is no unitary agent 
within this world of events that tells the story. Rather, based on the events that unfold in 
front of the spectator’s eyes she can reconstruct the story. And the following analogy 
explains why this should come as no surprise. Consider a sports event of your own 
choosing. Regardless of the event you pick it turns out that you are dealing with a series 
of happenings which meets all the requirements of a minimal narrative in the same 
sense that a story on screen does. The sports event has a clearly defined beginning and 
an end, it unfolds chronologically, and a story can be reconstructed out of it with agents 
(players) having a role in non-causal events counting as disturbances in the equilibrium 
(playing the game).ix The story could go something like this: the reigning boxing 
champion is dominating through most of the fight but in the fifth round he is knocked 
out by a punch to the solar plexus. In fact, a boxing match was accounted for in 
narrative terms much like this in R. W. Paul’s 1903 catalogue: 
[The match] opens with the referee bringing the gloves into the ring […] In the 
second round [Johnny] Hughes [the light weight-champion of England] is seen to 
get better of his opponent [Dido Plumb] […] In the fifth and last round […] 
[Plumb] hits him [Hughes] under his heart, which brings Hughes to the ground. He 
struggles hard to get up, but the blow has been too hard for him, and he is counted 
out, and the prize is awarded to Dido Plumb. (1983, 3) 
But is there anybody telling or, better yet, showing this story over and beyond the 
happenings on the sports arena themselves? Not the recording of the match, but the 
match itself? There might be a commentator near the ring, of course, but she cannot be 
 
 
the narrator in our sense of the term for she simply reports what she sees and is in 
principle in no more a privileged position to do so than we are. And even if the 
commentator was the narrator there are certainly sports events without commentators. 
There are happenings, therefore, which amount to narratives but have no narrators.  
Another example of such narratorless happenings which are nevertheless 
narratives are fictional happenings in plays. Just transfer the hypothetical boxing match 
on stage, have the actors make-believe they are boxing and the result is again a 
narratorless narrative but this time a fictional narratorless narrative.  The spectators are 
mandated to imagine the same story as above and at the same time they are not 
mandated to imagine anybody showing the story. On a more general level, in plays 
there are again imaginary agents (characters) who interact in non-causal manner which 
brings them out of the initial equilibrium and supplies the content for imaginary story 
but provides no mandates for narrators of such stories. Importantly, the property of 
narratorial absence in plays was not lost to the contemporaries who advised on writing 
‘plays in photographs’.  
Plays were seen to share much with the photoplays – certainly more than verbal 
narratives – because it was precisely the presentation of a story through visual action 
that was seen as common to both. Standard definitions of photoplay, for instance, put it 
like this: ‘A photoplay is a play which is acted before the camera, and is shown to an 
audience by means of the moving picture’ (Elbert Moore 1915, 18); ‘the photoplay is 
nothing but a series of scenes in action which make up a story’ (Berg J. Esenwein and 
Arthur Leeds 1913, 27); or ‘it is a story told in pictured action instead of described in 
words’ (Epes Winthrop Sargent 1913, 7). Verbal narratives, by contrast, were seen as 
having the luxury of long descriptions and slow development as opposed to the 
immediacy of visual action. In fact, the writers were often faulted for confusing written 
 
 
stories with photoplays. As a typical passage from the Photo Playwright attests: ‘Most 
of the amateur scenario writers tell only a story—always write stories, and use long 
leaders, etc. A photoplay is an action-story. The action is the essential thing’ (July 12, 
1912, 15). Crucially, this distinction between verbal recounting and visual action 
translated into seeing plays and photoplays as sharing the absence of narratorial 
control.x As the manual by Howard T. Dimick explicitly states: 
compulsory and self-explanatory causes and effects move the play without visible 
agency, save the cummulative [sic] circumstances which react upon the characters; 
in a [verbal] story the plot is frequently a matter of the author’s will alone, and of 
his obtruding personality, which we feel to control the events (1915, 20). 
Given that at the time ‘author’ as a term was used to denote both the author and the 
narrator – the separation would fully happen only with Genette’s narratology – the 
underlying idea here is that verbal fiction in general mandates imagining somebody 
telling the story on top of somebody actually telling it. This is so because on most 
occasions in written fiction there is some attitude taken towards the events, some 
running commentary on the events and this commentary amounts to a part of the 
narrative discourse. Given that verbal fiction invites readers to imagine not only the 
content of narrative discourse (the story) but the narrative discourse itself (the narrating) 
and given that this narrative discourse reveals some characteristics of the speaker 
behind it (‘obtruding personality’), Dimick finds it that readers are mandated to imagine 
a narrator which has those traits. Plays and photoplays, by contrast, although they are 
clearly artefacts as much as verbal fictions, do not mandate spectators to imagine any 
personality behind their narrative discourse – there is an asymmetry between them and 
written fiction.xi It is clear to Dimick that there is a team actually responsible for the 
narrative discourse – cameraman, director, actors, playwright, etc. – but by no means 
should anybody be imagined as behind the discourse: 
 
 
all the devices of the camera and its accessories are aimed at conveying through the 
medium of a sequence of pictures and pictured events a complete and self-
explanatory, dramatic action, which shall, by its appeal chiefly to the eye, unfold in 
the mind of the spectator satisfying effects and results of the playwright’s labors. 
(ibid., 67) 
There is undoubtedly a message and a sender responsible for it, but the content of the 
message does not mandate spectators to imagine a sender on top of the actual team 
behind the film.  
What does distinguish plays from photoplays (next to the use of film recording 
technology and film specific devices, of course) is the absence of the screen actors’ 
voices and recourse to written material such as titles, leaders and other types of inserts: 
‘A photoplay is a story told largely in pantomime by players, whose words are 
suggested by their actions, assisted by certain descriptive words thrown on the screen, 
and the whole produced by a moving-picture machine’ (Esenwein and Leeds 1913, 1). 
Perhaps it is these verbal additions that might have revealed some fictional personality 
telling the story to the contemporaries after all?  
Screenwriting manuals virtually never speak of lecturers attesting to their 
decline by 1912 so we are definitely not dealing with any lecturers as potential fictional 
narrators. It is the leaders and various other forms of written text that appear on screen 
that are the necessary evil in the pursuit of narrative clarity. Although the manuals make 
a recurrent point that ‘the perfect motion picture has no subtitles and needs none’ 
(Herbert Case Hoagland 1912, 14) they also readily admit that in practice there is no 
getting around them:  
when this [the complete elimination of leaders] is attempted, the lucidity of the 
story is too liable to suffer, whereas an occasional leader of a few words will 
bridge over a certain combination of events, giving the story a clearness quickly 
grasped by the audience, and perhaps avoid the introduction of several minor 
 
 
scenes otherwise necessary to make the story intelligible. (William Lewis Gordon 
1914, 17)  
Esenwein and Leeds (1913, 180–185) are the most systematic among the manual 
authors when it comes to clarifying the four main functions of leaders: 1) highlighting 
the passage of time, 2) explaining on-screen action when the profilmic and filmic events 
do not provide sufficient representational clarity, 3) ‘breaking’ a scene to shorten the 
on-screen time of a given action, and 4) guiding the spectator’s reception of the 
following scene.  
Much like other authors Esenwein and Leeds also distinguish between leaders 
proper (e.g. ‘After three years’) and ‘letters, clippings, and similar interests’ (e.g. 
‘Darling John, I am forever yours – Mary’). In our vocabulary the distinction is one of 
non-diegetic as opposed to diegetic material. The former is somehow ‘outside’ the 
story-proper: ‘the use of a leader is a frank confession that you [the photoplaywright] 
are incapable of “putting over” a point in the development of your plot solely by the 
action in the scenes—you must call in outside assistance, as it were’ (ibid., 171). From 
the perspective of mandated imaginings, furthermore, whereas the former mandates 
only to imagine the content of the sentence – that three years have passed – the latter 
mandates not only to imagine that Mary is in love with John but that she also wrote the 
letter to John comprising these very words.  
Contemporary authors of screenwriting manuals were fully aware of this 
because they clearly felt that the latter types of inserts, due to their specific 
narratological properties, presented less of an aesthetic problem than the former ones. 
As Esenwein and Leeds put it: ‘no matter what other kind of insert you employ, it will 
doubtless seem to be more a part of the action than will a plain leader. For this reason it 
is best, whenever possible, to use a letter, telegram, news item, or some similar insert, in 
 
 
place of a leader’ (ibid., 187). Caine, similarly, advises to ‘try to make leaders word 
pictures, so that the cut-ins will be part of the scenes themselves’ (1915, 196). In a 
description of a typical film, Sargent even explicitly states that the spectators are 
supposed to imagine the picture of the letter on screen as the visual appearance of the 
letter itself: ‘in the library in the heroine’s home [...] [t]he girl goes to the table and sits 
down to write. […] a written letter blots out the library. It is just as though we read the 
letter over her shoulder’ (1913, 14). Esenwein and Leeds add that there is a ‘ridiculous 
practice of many studios in having all their letters in films written in the same 
handwriting. A note written by a schoolboy, another penned by a society woman, and a 
letter laboriously spelled out by a tramp, all appear, to judge by the handwriting, to have 
been written by the same person’ (1913, 190). The suggestion is that the letters written 
by different people should be graphically distinguishable because spectators are 
mandated to imagine that the graphemes in question not only represents the content of 
the letter but also the visual appearance of the letter.  
Why does all this matter for the discussion of narrators? Because although 
contemporaries recognized the distinction between written inserts that are a part of the 
imaginary world (letters, clippings, etc.) and those which only describe that imaginary 
world being only a part of the film’s visual track (leaders proper), neither were seen as 
mandating any imaginings about the narrator:  
Few in an audience will object to the introduction of letters, telegrams, newspaper 
items, and the like—provided there are not too many such inserts—because these 
seem to fit into the picture as a part of the action, and are not, like leaders, plainly 
artificial interpolations by the author. (ibid.) 
The artificial-looking leaders are not sign of some imaginary narrator but simply marks 
of the director’s and the photoplaywright’s failure to convey the story through action 
(and occasional letter, clipping, etc.) alone. Even though, as I mentioned earlier, the 
 
 
term ‘author’ denoted both the author and the narrator at the time, Esenwein and Leeds 
are not talking about the author as the fictional narrator here for, unlike Dimick, there is 
no reference to anything like ‘obtruding personality’. Dimick’s point is that in verbal 
fiction it is often but not always the case that there is some running commentary which 
is indicative of personal traits of the narrator to be imagined. A good example of this is 
again Tristram Shandy. But on other occasions like Arthur Schnitzler’s The Dream 
Story where the information is conveyed in a matter-of-fact style no such personality 
comes forth. In these cases, Dimick denies the presence of an obtruding personality – a 
distinguishable narrator – but in saying so clearly does not suggest that this means that 
the stories in question have no authors. In other words, the difference between the 
author and the narrator is sufficiently clear. The ‘artificial interpolations by the author’ 
are interpolations of the actual agent of narrative discourse.  
It is true that the notion of ‘obtruding personality’ is not identical to what 
Genette has in mind when he speaks of narrators. For him every narrative, regardless of 
whether it is told by an imaginary character with a name such as Tristram Shandy or 
anonymously ‘in third person’, has a fictional narrator. So ‘obtruding personality’ is a 
subset of extradiegetic narrators. But ‘obtruding personality’ is what Gunning takes 
Griffith’s moral and other commentary to be. And yet, as we have seen, contemporary 
trade press denies this view.  
‘Obtruding personality’, moreover, is not the most fortunate way to approach the 
figure of the narrator in fiction film not least of all because the camera and the operator 
in The Big Swallow are not identifiable to the spectator during the first half of the film at 
all – their presence is revealed only retroactively and after they have been robbed of the 
narratorial role. This is not to deny, however, that for the contemporaries the notion of 
‘obtruding personality’ did important work. It contributed to a greater understanding of 
 
 
literary and film fiction insofar it distinguished the two from the perspective of 
narratorial control and implicit mandates behind this control. In other words, contrary to 
present-day scholars they were more apt in recognizing that unlike standard literary 
narratives, film narratives have no fictional narrators.  
In the final instance, it might be objected that if ‘obtruding personality’ is only a 
subset of extradiegetic narrators there is space for impersonal narrators even in film. 
After all, Genette has claimed that even literary ‘third person’ narratives have fictional 
narrators and Metz (1991) has explicitly argued for impersonal enunciation in film. The 
problem with Metz’s idea is that although there is good reason to imagine impersonal 
literary narrators based on linguistic deictic markers (e.g. ‘I’, ‘yesterday’, ‘here’, etc.), 
there are no analogues to deictic markers in film (Slugan 2015). And even if accepted 
Metz’s claim about a singular but general deictic accompanying every shot in film – 
‘there is’ – we have no reason to think that the deictic is fictional. In Genette’s terms, 
whereas the deictics in literary fiction do not refer to the act of actual writing but to the 
act of fictional narrating, the filmic ‘there is’ refers to the actual act of producing the 
film image. Put differently, films can tell their own fictional stories without any 
fictional narrators – a fact which contemporary screenwriting manuals recognized but 
which has eluded later theorists and historians.  
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i Next to Christian Metz some notable authors include Sarah Kozloff (1988), François Jost 
(1999), David A. Black (1986), Seymour Chatman (1990), Francesco Casetti (1998), Peter 
Verstraten (2009), and George Wilson (2011). The most prominent exception is David 
Bordwell (1985). Although there is little debate on this matter among film scholars in 
general, it is very lively among those applying analytic philosophy to film. For recent 
contributions see Angela Curran (2016) and Mario Slugan (2015, 2019).  
ii Gunning’s view has at least since 1999 even been included in perhaps the most widely read 
reader on film studies – Leo Braudy’s and Marshall Cohen’s Film Theory and Criticism: 
Introductory Readings. This attests to the fact that this view of film narrators is formative.  
iii It is important to remember that for Genette ‘extradiegetic’ does not mean outside the story 
world but on the lowest narrative level. Both Tristram Shandy and the anonymous narrator 
of Pere Goriot are extradiegetic for Genette. 
iv For a detailed account of fiction as mandated imagining see Kendall Walton (1990). For a 
book-length application of Walton’s theory to early cinema see Mario Slugan (2019). 
v This approach also has an added benefit on minimizing the number of theoretical entities – in 
Gaudreault there is a proliferation of film narrators which include pro-filmic monstrator, 
filmographic monstrator, filmographic mega-monstrator, filmographic narrator, and film 
mega-narrator (the great image maker).  
vi For a detailed account of demands for narrative clarity in the transitional era see Charlie Keil 
(2001). Importantly, the historical part of my argument about the inexistence of film 
narrators does not hinge on whether the crisis of narrative comprehensibility was as acute 
as I suggest or whether the strategy of films telling their own stories was indeed the ideal 
one and accepted by all. Rather, it hinges on what screenwriters meant when describing 
films as telling their own stories and on their accounts of leaders.  
vii I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this reference. 
viii For an in-depth history of American screenwriting see Edward Azlant (1980, 1997). 
ix Cf. Marie-Laure Ryan’s (2007). 
x This distinction mirrors the classic Aristotelian mimesis/diegesis distinction with mimesis 
understood as direct imitation and diegesis as narrative representation.  
xi Gaudreault insists that there is an agent responsible for showing the happenings on stage – the 
monstrator. Although generally invisible the traces of his activity, according to 
Gaudreault, can be seen in the use of techniques such as prologue and epilogue as well as 
devices characteristic of epic and expressionist theater (placards, voice-off, gestus, etc.). 
                                                 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
We are again dealing with a formally invalid argument which claims that the presence of a 
narrative discourse conveying a fictional story necessary entails the existence of a fictional 
narrator. Cf. Gaudreault (2009, 72-80). 
